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PERCEPTION OF RISK FROM RADIATION
Paul Slovic
How does the public perceive the risksassociated withexposure to radiation? Perhaps the
most important generalization from research in thisdomain is thatthere is no uniform or
consistent perception of radiation risks. This is what makes this topic sofascinating to study.
Public perception and acceptance is determined by the context in which radiation is used—and
the very different reactions to different uses provide insight into thenature of perception and the
determinants of acceptable risk.
A second generalization, and a disturbing one, is that in every context of use, with the
exception ofnuclear weapons, public perceptions ofradiation risk differ from the assessments of
the majority ofexperts on radiation and its effects. Insome cases, members ofthe public see far
greater risks associated with a radiation technology than do technical experts—in others the
public ismuch less concerned than the experts believe they should be. Although differences
between perceptions oflaypersons and those ofexperts cannot be attributed inany simple way to
degree ofknowledge, it is clear that better information and education about radiation and its
consequences is needed. With the exception ofstudies that have designed brochures tohelp
people understand their risk from radon, there has been little effort orprogress made on the
communication side.
There isa particularly urgent need to develop plans and materials for communicating with the
public in the event ofa radiological disaster. This point is driven home by the difficulties
observed in Europe after Chernobyl, and inthe chaos and disruption that reigned inGoiania,
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Brazil, after two scavengers unwittingly sawed open a capsule containing cesium that had been
used for cancer therapy.
During the remainder of this paper I shall attempt to elaborate these points by highlighting
some key results and conclusions pertaining to
• the nature of risk perceptions,
• the impacts of perceptions, and
• the need for communication about radiological hazards.
The Psychometric Paradigm
One broad strategy for studying perceived risk is to develop a taxonomy for hazards that can
be used to understand and predict responses to their risks. A taxonomic scheme might explain,
for example, people's extreme aversion to some hazards, their indifference to others, and the
discrepancies between these reactions and experts' opinions. One approach to this goal has
employed the psychometric paradigm^1l' which uses psychophysical scaling and multivariate
analysis techniques to produce quantitative representations or "cognitive maps" of risk attitudes
and perceptions.
Within the psychometric paradigm, people make quantitative judgments about the current
and desired riskiness of diverse hazards and the desired level of regulation of each. In one of the
earliest psychometric studies, four different groups of people were asked to rate 30 activities
(e.g., smoking, fire fighting), substances (e.g., food coloring), and technologies (e.g., railroads,
aviation) according to the present risk of death from each.'2"3) Three groups were from Eugene,
Oregon; they included 30 college students, 40 members of the League of Women Voters
(LOWV), and 25 business and professional members of the "Active Club." The fourth groupwas
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composed of 15 persons selected nationwide for their professional involvement in risk
assessment. This "expert" group included a geographer, an environmental policy analyst, an
economist, a lawyer, a biologist, a biochemist, and a government regulator of hazardous
materials.
Each were asked, for each of the 30 items, "to consider the risk of dying (across all U.S.
society as a whole) as a consequence of this activity or technology." To make the evaluation task
easier, each activity appeared on a 3" x 5" card. Respondents were told first to study the items
individually, thinking of all the possible ways someone might die from each (e.g., fatalities from
non-nuclear electricity were to include deaths resulting from the mining of coal and other energy
production activities as well as electrocution; motor vehicle fatalities were to include collisions
with bicycles and pedestrians). Next, theV were to order the items from least tomost risky and,
finally, to assign numerical risk values by giving a rating of 10 to the least risky item and making
the other ratings accordingly. They were also given additional suggestions, clarifications, and
encouragement to do as accurate a job as possible.
Table 1 shows how the various groups ranked these 30 activities and technologies according
to riskiness. There were many similarities between the three groups of laypeople. For example,
each group believedthat motorcycles, motorvehicles, and handguns were highly risky, while
vaccinations, home appliances, power mowers, and football posed relatively little risk. However,
there were strong differences as well. Active Clubmembers viewedpesticidesand spray cans as
relatively muchsafer than did the othergroups. Nuclear powerwas ratedas highest in risk by the
LOWV and studentgroups, but only eighthby the Active Club. The studentsviewed
contraceptives as riskierand mountain climbing as saferthan did the other lay groups. Experts'
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judgments of risk differed markedly from the judgments of laypeople. The experts viewed
electric power, surgery, swimming, and X-rays as more risky than did the other groups, and they
judged nuclear power, police work, and mountain climbing to be much less risky.
Insert Table 1 about here
In an attempt to understand why some hazards were rated more risky than others, Fischhoff,
Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, and Combs^2) borrowed a technique from personality theorists and
tried to assess what might be called the "personality" of hazards. They asked people, in addition
to estimating the perception of risk, to evaluate each hazard item or activity on a variety of scales
that were hypothesized to be related to the perception and acceptance of risk—such as whether
exposure to the activity is voluntary or not, whether it has the potential to be catastrophic,
whether it evokes an emotional reaction, whether it can kill people or not, how well known it is
to those exposed or to science, whether its effects are immediate vs. delayed, whether it is
controllable or noncontrollable, whether the technology involved is new vs. old, and whether the
risk situation is equitable vs. not equitable. (Equity is a concept whereby people who bear the
risk also get the benefit. If a risk situation is not equitable, then one person gets the benefit, and
someone else gets the risk.) From these ratings, profiles emerged (see Figure 1) much like
personality profiles. They found that, not only do nuclear power and X-rays, for example, have a
very different stature on perceptionof risk, they also have very different profiles. The qualityof
their risks was judged to be different. Nuclear power was seen as less voluntary, more
catastrophic, higher in dread, more likely to be fatal, less controllable, newer,and so forth. They
also found that these qualities were not independent across hazards. They tended to be associated
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across the domain of hazards. If something was judged to be voluntary, it tended also to be seen
as controllable. If something was judged to be catastrophic, it also tended to be judged as fatal,
and so forth.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Fischhoffetal.(2) performed a factor analysis on the relationships among these variables,
which yielded two very strong factors that we called "dread" risk and "unknown" risk. The
"dread" risk factor was combined from three scales which loaded on that factor—dread,
catastrophic potential, and fatal. The "unknown" risk factor combined judgments on the scales
unknown, unfamiliar, and delayed consequences.
Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein^4) conducted anew study with amuch larger number of
scales, and a larger number of items, some 90 hazards rated on 15 scales. Again, factor analysis
yielded a two-factor representation, with the factors designated as "dread" and "unknown."
However, in this case, the dread factor loaded on uncontrollable, catastrophic, fatal, not
equitable, high risk to future generations, not easily reduced, and involuntary. The "unknown"
factor loaded on unobservable, delayed effects, and so forth. The space, shown in Figure 2, was
very revealing. Nuclear energy hazards and chemical hazards were located in the unknown and
dread quadrant of the space. Medicines tendedto fall in the upper left quadrant, everyday hazards
in the lower left quadrant, and commoncatastrophic hazards in the lower right quadrant.
Insert Figure 2 about here
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Additional research has shown that laypeople's risk perceptions and attitudes are closely
related to the position of a hazard within the factor space shown in Figure 2. Most important is
the factor Dread Risk. The higher a hazard's score on this factor (i.e., the further to the right it
appears in the space), the higher its perceived risk, the more people want to see its current risks
reduced, and the more they want to see strict regulation employed to achieve the desired
reduction in risk. In contrast, experts' perceptions of risk are not closely related to any of the
various risk characteristics or factors derived from these characteristics. Instead, as noted earlier,
experts appear to see riskiness as synonymous with expected annual mortality. As a result, some
conflicts over "risk" may result from experts and laypeople having different definitions of the
concept.
Perception of Radiation Risk
Numerous psychometric surveys conducted during the past decade have examined
perceptions of risk and benefit from various radiationtechnologies. This work shows that there is
no general pattern of perception for radiation. Different sources of radiation exposure are
perceived in different ways. This was evident in the first psychometric study, summarized in
Table 1. There we see that three groups of laypersons perceived nuclear power as having very
high risk (rank 1,1, and 8 out of 30 hazards) whereas a group of risk-assessment experts had a
mean risk rating that put nuclear power 20th in the hierarchy. Note also that the three groups of
laypersons judged medicalX-rays relatively low in risk (ranks22, 17,and 24), whereasthe
experts placed it 7th. Thuswe see that two radiation technologies wereperceived differently
from one another and differently from the views of experts.
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Figure 2 further illustrates the differences in perception of various radiation hazards. Note
that nuclear-reactor accidents, radioactive waste, and fallout from nuclear weapons testing are
located in the upper-right quadrant of the factor space, reflecting people's perceptions that these
technologies are uncontrollable, dread, catastrophic, lethal, and inequitable in their distribution of
risks and benefits. Diagnostic X-rays are perceived much more favorably on these scales, hence
they fall in the upper-left quadrant of the space. Nuclear weapons fall in the lower-right quadrant,
separating from nuclear-reactor accidents, nuclear waste, and fallout on the scales measuring
knowledge, immediacy of effects, and observability of effects.
Although Table 1 and Figure 2 represent data from small and nonrepresentative samples
collected a decade or more ago, recent surveys of the general public in the U.S., Sweden, and
Canada show consistently that nuclear power and nuclear waste are perceived as extremely high
in risk and low in benefit to society, whereas medical X-rays are perceived as very beneficial and
low in risk/5"7) Smaller studies in Norway and Hungary have also obtained these results/8"9)
Perceptions of risk associated with nuclear waste are evenmorenegative than perceptions of
nuclear power/5,10"14) When asked to state whatever images or associations came to mind when
they heard the words "underground nuclearwaste storage facility," a representative sampleof
Phoenix, Arizona, residents could hardly think of anything that was not frightening or
problematic (see Table 2). Thedisposal of nuclear wastes is a technology that experts believe can
be managed safely andeffectively. The discrepancy between thisview andthe images shown in
Table 2 is indeed startling.
Insert Table 2 about here
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The perception of nuclear power as a catastrophic technology was studied in depth by Slovic,
Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff/15) They found that, before the TMI accident, people expected
nuclear-power accidents to lead to disasters of immense proportions. Scenarios of reactor
accidents were found to resemble scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear war. Replication of these
studies after the TMI event found even more extreme "images of disaster."
The powerful negative imagery evoked by nuclear power and radiation is discussed from a
historical perspective by Weart/16) Weart argues that modern thinking about radioactivity
employs beliefs and symbols that have been associated for centuries with the concept of
transmutation—the passage through destruction to rebirth. In the early decades of the 20th
century, transmutation images became centered on radioactivity, which was associated with
"uncanny rays that brought hideous death of miraculous new iife; with mad scientists andtheir
ambiguous monsters; with cosmic secrets of life and death; ...and with weapons great enough to
destroy the world..." (p. 42).
But this concept of transmutation has a duality that is hardly evident in the imagery
associated with nuclear power and nuclear wastes. Why has the evil overwhelmed the good? The
answerundoubtedly involves the bombing of Hiroshima andNagasaki, whichlinkedthe dread
images to reality. The sprouting ofnuclear power in the aftermath of the atomic bombing has led
Smith'17) to observe:
Nuclear energy was conceived in secrecy, born in war, and first revealed to the world
in horror. No matter how much proponents try to separate the peaceful from the
weapons atom, the connection is firmly embedded in the minds of the public, (p. 62)
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Additional insights into the special quality ofnuclear fear are provided byErikson/18) who
draws attention to the broad, emerging theme of toxicity, both radioactive and chemical, that
characterizes a "whole new species of trouble" associated with modern technological disasters.
Erikson describes the exceptionally dread quality of technological accidents that expose people
to radiation and chemicals in ways that "contaminate rather than merely damage; ...pollute,
befoul, and taint rather than just create wreckage; ...penetrate human tissue indirectly rather than
wound the surface by assaults of a more straightforward kind" (p. 120). Unlike natural disasters,
these accidents are unbounded. Unlike conventional disaster plots, they have no end. "Invisible
contaminants remain a part of the surroundings—absorbed into the grain of the landscape, the
tissues of the body, and, worst of all, into the genetic material of the survivors. An 'all clear' is
never sounded. The book of accounts is never closed" (p. 121).
Erikson's "contamination model" may explain, in part, the reaction of the public to exposures
to carcinogens. Numerous studies have found that a high percentage (60-75%) of people believe
that if a person is exposed to a chemical that can cause cancer, that person will probably get
cancer some day/20'21) Asimilarly high percentage believe that "exposure toradiation will
probably lead to cancer some day."(21) The beliefthat any exposure to acarcinogen is likely to
lead to cancer tends to coincide with the belief that it can never be too expensive to reduce such
risks/20) Therefore, it is not surprising to find inananalysis ofmore than 500 life-saving
interventions by Tengs et al/22) that radiation controls in industry were associated with the
highest costs per year of life saved.
The deep fears and anxieties associated with radiation and with nuclear power make the cases
in which radiation is responded to rather casually of particular interest. For example, Sandman,
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Weinstein, and Klotz^23) surveyed residents inthe Reading Prong area ofNew Jersey, a region
characterized by very high radon levels in many homes. They found that residents there were
basically apathetic about the risk. Few had bothered to monitor their homes for radon. Most be
lieved that, although radon might be a problem for their neighbors, their own homes did not have
any problem.
A striking contrast to the apathy regarding radon in homes is the strong public reaction that
developed in many New Jersey cities when the state attempted to develop a landfill in which to
place 14,000 barrelsof mildly radioactive soil. The soil had been excavated from the former site
of a radium watch-dial factory that had operated at the turn of the century. Over a period of
several years, the state tried in vain to find acommunity that would accept the soil/24)
Table 3 summarizesthe status ofperceived risk for six radiation technologies, contrasting the
views of technical experts with the views of the generalpublic. In addition to nuclear power,
nuclear waste, X-rays, radon, and nuclear weapons, food irradiation^25) and a source ofnon
ionizing radiation, electric andmagnetic fields (EMF), are included in the table,although there is
relatively lessinformation about perceptions of these two sources. We see that there is typically
disagreement between the experts andthe public regarding the level of riskand its acceptability.
To my knowledge there have been onlytwo published studies thus far of perceptions of risk from
electric and magnetic fields. Both of these studies, by Morgan et al/26) and MacGregor, Slovic,
and Morgan/27) found that perceived risks associated with fields from home appliances and
electric blankets were relatively low, and that perceived risks associated with large power lines
were relatively high. Both studies also showed that, when the respondents were given a briefing
about research on health effects of electric fields (which said that many studies had been done
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but no adverse human health effects had yet been reliably demonstrated), their perceptions on
subsequent retest shifted toward greater perceived risk. MacGregor et al. found that this briefing
(in the form of a brochure) also lead to greater dread (particularly regarding power-line risks) less
perceived equity, and greater concernregarding effects of EMF on the nervous system, the
immune system, cell growth and reproduction, chronic depression, and cancer. These results
imply that, as concerns (and reports of research) about the risks from electric and magnetic fields
continue to be publicized, publicfears will increase. The significance of the public's uneasiness
about these fields is documented by Florig/28) who estimated that the utility industry spends
more than one billion dollars annually attempting to mitigate public concerns.
Insert Table 3 about here
Conspicuously missing from Table 3 is exposure from radiation medicine. An extensive
search of Medline and six other data bases using key words such as radiation, risk perception,
fear, and nuclear medicine failed to uncover any studies of perception of risk regarding the use of
radionuclides in medicine.
It is instructive to compare perceptions of risk and benefit for various radiation technologies
with perceptions ofvarious chemical technologies. Concerns about chemical risks have risen
dramatically in the pastdecade, spurred by well-publicized crises at Love Canal, NewYork,
Times Beach, Missouri, and many other waste sites; by major accidents at Seveso, Italy, Bhopal,
India, andPrince William Sound, Alaska; and by numerous other problems such as the
contamination ofground water and flour with the pesticide ethylene dibromide (EDB) and the
controversy regarding the use ofAlar, a growth regulator, in apples. The image ofchemical
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technologies is so negative that when you ask members of the general public to tell you what first
comes to mind when they hear the word "chemicals," by far the most frequent response is
"dangerous" or some synonym (e.g., toxic, hazardous, poison, deadly). Chemicals in general and
agricultural and industrial chemicals in particular are seen as very high risk and very low benefit,
as are nuclear power and nuclear-waste technologies. However, just as medical uses of radiation
(such as X-rays) are perceived in a very favorable way, differently from other radiation
technologies, so are prescription drugs, which are a very potent and toxic category of chemicals
to which we are often exposed at high doses. Figure 3, taken from a study inCanada'7) illustrates
the parallels between nuclear power and nonmedical chemicals (pesticides) seen as high in risk
and low in benefit and between X-rays and prescription drugs (high benefit/low to moderate
risk). Anational survey in Sweden has shown much the same results/6)
Insert Figure 3 about here
Lessons
What does this research tell us about the acceptance ofrisk from radiation? There seem to be
several lessons:
First, although many technical experts have labeled public reactions as irrational or phobic,
such accusations are clearly unjustified/29) There is a logic to public perceptions and behaviors
that has become apparent through research. For example, the acceptance afforded X-rays and
prescription drugs suggests that acceptance ofrisk is conditioned by perceptions ofdirect
benefits andby trust in the managers of the technology, in this case the medical and
pharmaceutical professions. The managers ofnuclear power and nonmedical chemical
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technologies are clearly less trusted and the benefits of these technologies are not highly
appreciated, hence their risks are less acceptable. Highrisks from nuclearweapons are tolerated
because of their perceivednecessity (and probably also becausepeople lack knowledge about
how to intervene in military security issues; they do have such knowledge and opportunities to
intervene in the management of nuclear power).
The apathetic response to the risk from radonappears to result from the fact that it is of
natural origin, occurring in a comfortable, familiar setting, withno oneto blame. Moreover, it
can never be totally eliminated. Opposition to the burial of radioactive soil, on the other hand,
likely derives from the fact that thishazard is imported, technological in origin, industry andthe
state are blameworthy, it is involuntary, has a visible focus (the barrels or the landfill), and can
be totally eliminated by preventing the deposition in the landfill/23)
The Impacts of Perceptions
It has become quite clearthat, whether or not one agrees withpublic riskperceptions, they
form a realitythat cannotbe ignored in riskmanagement. The impactof publicperceptions on
regulatory agencies is illustrated by the report ofa task force assembled by the Environmental
Protection Agency to evaluate the Agency's priorities/30) The task force concluded that EPA's
actual priorities and legislative authorities corresponded more closely with public opinion than
they did with the task force's estimates of the relative risks.
Ripple Effects
During the past decade, research has also shown that individual risk perceptions and
cognitions, interacting with social and institutional forces, can trigger massive social, political,
and economic impacts. Early theories equated the magnitude of impact to the number ofpeople
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killed or injured, or to the amount of property damaged. The accident at TMI, however, provided
a dramatic demonstration that factors besides injury, death, and property damage impose serious
costs. Despite the fact that not a single person died at TMI, andfew if any latent cancer fatalities
were expected, no other accident in our history has produced such costly societal impacts/31"32)
In addition to its impacton the utilitythat owned and operated the plant, this accident also
imposed enormous costs onthenuclear industry and onsociety. These came from stricter
regulation, reduced operation ofreactors worldwide, greater public opposition to nuclear power,
reliance onmore expensive energy sources, and increased costs of reactor construction and
operation.
Atheory aimed atdescribing how psychological, social, cultural, and political factors interact
to "amplify risk" and produce ripple effects has been presented by Kasperson et al/33) An
important element ofthis theory is the assumption that the perceived seriousness ofanaccident
or other unfortunate event, the mediacoverage it gets, and the long-range costs and other higher-
order impacts on the responsible company, industry, oragency are determined, inpart, by what
the event signals orportends. Signal value reflects the perception that the event provides new
information about the likelihood of similar or more destructive future mishaps.
The informativeness orsignal value ofan event, and thus its potential social impact, appears
to be systematically related to the characteristics ofthe hazard. An accident that takes many lives
may produce relatively little social disturbance (beyond that caused the victims' families and
friends) if it occurs as part ofa familiar and well-understood system (e.g., a train wreck).
However, a small accident in an unfamiliar system (or one perceived as poorly understood), such
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as a nuclear reactor, may have immense social consequences if it is perceived as a harbinger of
further (and possible catastrophic) mishaps.
The concept of accidents as signalshelps explainour society's strongresponse to problems
involving nuclear power and nuclear wastes. Because these nuclear hazards are seen as poorly
understood and catastrophic, accidents anywhere may be seen as omens of future disasters
everywhere, thus producing large socioeconomic andpolitical impacts.
Stigma
Substantial socioeconomic impacts may also result from the stigma associated with radiation
contamination. The word stigma was used by the ancient Greeks to refer to bodily marks or
brands that were designed to expose infamy or disgrace—to show, for example, that the bearer
was a slave or criminal. As used today, the word denotes someone"marked" as deviant, flawed,
spoiled, orgenerally undesirable inthe view ofsome observer. When the stigmatizing
characteristic is observed, the person is denigrated or avoided. Prime targets for stigmatization
aremembers of minority groups, the aged, homosexuals, drug addicts, alcoholics, and persons
afflicted with physical Or mental disabilities and deformities.
A dramatic example of stigmatization involving radiation occurred in September, 1987, in
Goiania, Brazil, where twomen searching for scrap metal dismantled a cancer therapy device in
an abandoned clinic. In doing so, they sawed open a capsule containing 28 grams of cesium
chloride. Children and workers nearby were attracted to the glowing material and beganplaying
with it. Before the danger was realized, several hundred people became contaminated and four
persons eventually died from acute radiation poisoning. Publicity about the incident led to
stigmatization ofthe region and its residents/34) Hotels in other parts of the country refused to
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allow Goiania residents to register, airline pilots refused to fly with Goiania residents on board,
automobiles driven by Goianians were stoned, hotel occupancy in the region dropped 60% for
six weeks following the incident, and virtually all conventions were canceled during this period.
The sale prices of products manufactured in Goiania dropped by 40% after the first news reports
and remained depressed for a period of 30-45 days despite the fact that no items were ever found
i'
to have been contaminated.
Risk Communication: Placing Radiation Risks in Perspective
Giventhe importance of risk perceptions and the extraordinary divergence between
perceptions ofexperts 'and laypersons inthe domains ofchemical and radiation technologies, it is
not surprising that there has been a burgeoning interest in the topic of "riskcommunication."
Much has been written about the need to inform and educate people about risk and the
difficulties ofdoing so/35"43) As many writers have observed, doing an adequate job of
communicating about riskmeans finding comprehensible ways of presenting complex technical
material that is clouded by uncertaintyand is inherentlydifficult to understand.
The crux of the communication problemis providing information that puts risk into
perspective ina way that facilitates decision making. One important lesson emerged from the
1983-1984controversy over ethylene dibromide, a widely used pesticide that was detected at
very lowlevels in packaged foods. The Environmental Protection Agency, which was
responsible for regulating ethylene dibromide, disseminated information about the aggregate risk
of this chemical to the exposed population. Although the media accurately transmitted EPA's
"macro" analysis, newspaper editorials and public reaction clearly indicated an inability to
translate this into a "micro"perspective on the riskto an exposed individual. What the newspaper
tt-
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reader or TV viewer wanted to know, and had trouble learning, was the answer to the question
"ShouldI eat the bread?'<44)
Risk Comparisons
One of the few "principles" in this field that seems to be useful is the assertion that
comparisons are more meaningful than absolute numbers or probabilities, especially when these
absolute values are quite small. Sowby( 5) argued that to decide whether or not we are
responding adequately to radiation risks we need to compare them to "some of the other risks of
life." Rothschild^46) observed "There isno point in getting into a panic about the risks oflife
until you have compared the risks which worry you with those that don't, but perhaps should."
Typically, suchexhortations are followed by elaborate tables and even"catalogs of risks" in
which diverse indices of death or disability are displayed for a broad spectrum of life's hazards.
Thus Sowby(45) provided extensive data on risks per hour ofexposure, showing, for example,
that an hour riding amotorcycle is as risky as an hour ofbeing 75 years old. Wilson^47)
developed a tableof activities (e.g., flying 1000 miles byjet, having one chestX-ray), eachof
which is estimated to increase one's annual chance of death by 1 in one million. Cohen and
Lee(48) rank ordered many hazards interms oftheir reduction in life expectancy onthe
assumption that "to some approximation, the ordering should be society'sorderof priorities.
However,we see several very major problems that have received very little attention . .. whereas
some of the items near the bottom of the list, especially those involving radiation, receive a great
i.
deal ofattention" (p. 720). Arelated exercise by Reissland and Harries^49) compared loss of life
expectancy in the nuclear industry with that in other occupations.
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Although such risk comparisons may provide some aid to intuition, they do not educate as
effectively as their proponents have assumed. For example, although some people may feel
enlightened on learning that a single takeoff or landing in acommercial airliner takes an average
of 15 minutes offone's life expectancy, others may find themselves completely bewildered by
such information. When landing ortaking off, one will either die prematurely (almost certainly
by more than 15 minutes) or one will not. From the standpoint ofthe individual, averages do not
adequately capture theessence of such risks.
Furthermore, the research on risk perception described earlier shows that perception and
acceptance of risk are determined not only by accident probabilities, annual mortality rates, and
losses oflife expectancy, but also by numerous other characteristics ofhazards such as benefits,
uncertainty, controllability, catastrophic potential, equity, and threat to future generations.
Therefore, the fact that a particular risk issmaller, by comparison, than other risks that are
considered acceptable, does not necessarily imply that it, too, should be acceptable. Moreover,
within the perceptual space defined by the various characteristics ofrisks, each hazard is unique.
Astatement such as"the annual risk from living near anuclear power plant is equivalent to the
risk ofriding an extra 3miles in an automobile" fails to consider how these two technologies
differ on the many qualities that people believe to be important. As a result, such statements are
likely to produce anger rather than enlightenment and they are not likely to be convincing in the
face of criticism/50"5 )
In sum, comparisons across diverse hazards may be useful tools for educating the public. Yet
the facts do not speak for themselves. Comparative analyses must be performed with great care
to be worthwhile.
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Fortunately, radiation risks can be compared in a number of useful and defensible ways.
Radiation emissions can, be measured and comparisons can be made between actual or potential
exposure levels ofconcern and familiar, everyday exposures from natural sources ofradiation or
medical X-rays and treatments. Bymaking comparisons from one source ofradiation to another,
one avoids theapples vs. oranges comparisons that befuddle and anger people.
Wilson^52) used comparisons with natural sources ofradiation to put the risks from the
Chernobyl accident into perspective for the 2million people living downwind from the reactor in
Byelorussia. He noted that the estimated increased lifetime dose was 0.7 rem for each ofthese
persons and that this is considerably less than the difference in the lifetime external dose aperson
receives onmoving from New York to Denver. It isalso less than the difference in the dose a
person receives from inhaled radon ifhe or she moves from an average New England house to an
average Pennsylvania house.
Whenradiation from Chernobyl reached the United States, the Inter-Agency Task Force,
chaired by EPA administrator Lee Thomas, used similar comparisons to illustrate the low level
ofrisk involved. Media stories pointed out that exposures inthe U.S. were a small fraction ofthe
exposure from achest X-ray. Anews story from Portland, Oregon indicated that readings of2.9
picocuries ofiodine-131 per cubic meter ofair were insignificant compared to the 2700 picocurie
level that would trigger concern.
This discussion is not meant to imply that we already know how to communicate radiation
risks effectively. Communication about Chernobyl was dreadful in Europe/53"57) Information
messages were peppered with different terms (roentgens, curies, bequerels, rads, rems, sieverts,
grays) which were explained poorly or not at all. Public anxiety was high and not always related
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to actual threat. Public officials were at odds with one another and inconsistent in their
evaluations of risks from consuming various kinds of food or milk. Comparisons with exposure
to natural radiation from familiar activities were not well received because the media and the
public did not trust the sources of such information. Other comparisons (e.g., with background
cancerrates) fared even worse. Many of the statements made by officials to calm the public
confused and angered them instead. Although communications in the U.S. effectively maintained
a calm perspective, onecould saythat U.S. officials had a relatively easy job. All they hadto do
was convince people thatminuscule levels of radiation were nota threat. Hadthere been higher
levels and"hot spots" as in the Soviet Union andwestern Europe, thejob of communicating
would have beenfar tougher and it is not clear thatproper perspectives on risk would have been
achieved.
The good news is that enough is known about radiation and about risk communication to
enable us to craft useful risk comparisons, if we devote proper attention andresources to doing
so (see, e.g., the effort by Johnson, Fisher, Smith, &Desvousges^58) to inform homeowners
about their risks from radon; and the recommendations by Adelstein'59)).
Mental Models
Animportant new development is the use ofmental models to guide risk-communication
efforts/60"61) Mental models are detailed representations of a person's knowledge andbeliefs
about a hazard and its consequences. These models are elicited bymeans of an interview
procedure, beginning with open-ended questions (e.g., "what do you know about radon?") and
proceeding to more specific questions about exposure, effects, and mitigation issues. Ultimately,
the person's valid knowledge and misconceptions are identified and risk communication is
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designed to fill knowledge gaps and correct misconceptions. This technique has been applied,
with some success, in the design of brochures to inform people aboutthe risks of radon (Atman
et al., 1994; Bostrom et al., 1994).
Framing Effects
It would becomforting to believe that risk attitudes and perceptions, if erroneous, would
respond to informational and educational programs. Unfortunately, psychological research
demonstrates that people's beliefs change slowly and are extraordinarily persistent in the face of
contrary evidence/62) Once formed, initial impressions tend to structure the way that subsequent
evidence is interpreted. New evidence appears reliable and informative if it isconsistent with
one's initial beliefs; contrary evidence isdismissed asunreliable, erroneous, orunrepresentative.
When people lack strong prior opinions, the opposite situation exists—they are atthe mercy
ofthe way that the information is presented. Subtle changes in the way that risks are "framed" or
expressed can have amajor impact on perceptions and decisions. One dramatic example of
framing in the context ofmedical decision making comes from a study by McNeil, Pauker, Sox,
and Tverskyt63) who asked people to imagine that they had lung cancer and had to choose
between surgery or radiation therapy. The two treatments were described insome detail. Then,
some subjects were presented with the cumulative probabilities ofsurviving for varying lengths
of time after the treatment. Other subjects received the same cumulative probabilities framed in
terms ofdying rather than surviving (e.g., instead of being told that 68% ofthose having surgery
will have survived after one year, they were told that 32% will have died—see Table 4). Framing
the statistics in terms ofdying dropped the percentage ofsubjects choosing radiation therapy
over surgery from 44% to 18%. The effect was as strong for physicians as for laypersons.
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Insert Table 4 about here
Numerous other examples of "framing effects" have been demonstrated by Tversky and
Kahneman^64) andothers. The fact thatsubtle differences in how risks are presented canhave
such marked effects suggests that those responsiblefor information programs have considerable
ability to manipulate perceptions and behavior. This possibility raises ethical problems thatmust
be addressed by any responsible risk-information program.
Risk Communication and Trust
Social relationships of all types, including riskmanagement, rely heavily on trust. Indeed,
much of the contentiousness that has been observed in the risk-management arena has been
attributed to a climate of distrust that exists between the public, industry, and risk-management
professionals/65"66)
Also, asnoted earlier, greater public acceptance ofmedical technologies based on chemicals
and radiation, as opposed to industrial technologies, can beexplained bytherelatively high
degree oftrust inphysicians and other health-care workers. Typical ofthe research findings are
the conclusions ofBord and O'Connor^25) regarding their survey ofpublic acceptance of food
irradiation: "The most consistent, dramatic finding ... is the impact of trust on acceptability:
trust in industry in general, in the food irradiation industry specifically, in government regulatory
agencies, and in science itself (p. 505).
The limited effectiveness of risk-communication efforts in many circumstances can be
attributed to the lack of trust. If youtrust theriskmanager, communication is relatively easy. If
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trust is lacking, no form or process of communication will be satisfactory/54,67) Thus trust is
more fundamental to conflict resolution than is risk communication.
One of the most fundamental qualities of trust has been known for ages. Trust is fragile. It is
typically created rather slowly, but it can be destroyed inan instant—by a single mishap or
mistake. Thus, once trust is lost, it maytake a long timeto rebuild it to its former state. In some
instances, lost trust may never be regained. Abraham Lincoln understood this quality. Ina letter
to Alexander McClure he observed: "If youonce forfeit the confidence of yourfellow citizens,
you can never regain their respect and esteem" [italics added].
The fact thattrust is easier to destroy than to create reflects certain fundamental mechanisms
ofhuman psychology called here "the asymmetry principle." When itcomes to winning trust, the
playing field is not level. It is tilted toward distrust, for each ofthe following reasons:
1. Negative (trust-destroying) events are more visible or noticeable than positive (trust-
building) events. Negative events often take the form ofspecific, well-defined incidents such as
accidents, lies, discoveries oferrors or other mismanagement. Positive events, while sometimes
visible, more often are fuzzy orindistinct. For example, how many positive events are
represented by the safe operation ofanuclear power plant for one day? Is this one event? dozens
ofevents? hundreds? There is no precise answer. When events are invisible orpoorly defined,
they carry little orno weight inshaping our attitudes and opinions.
2. When events do come to our attention, negative (trust-destroying) events carry much
greater weight than positive events. This important psychological tendency is illustrated by a
study in which 103 college students rated the impact on trust of45 hypothetical news events
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pertaining to the management ofalarge nuclear power plant in their community/65) Some of
these events were designed to be trust increasing, such as
• There have been no reported safetyproblems at the plant during the past year.
• There is careful selection and training of employees at the plant.
• Plant managers live nearby the plant.
• The county medical examiner reports that the health ofpeople living near the plant is
better than the average for the region.
Otherevents were designedto be trust decreasing, such as
• Apotential safety problem was found tohave been covered up by plant officials.
• Plant safety inspections are delayed inorder tomeet the electricity production quota for
the month.
• A nuclear power plant in another state has a serious accident.
• The county medical examiner reports that the health ofpeople living near the plant is
worse than the average for the region.
The respondents were asked to indicate, for each event, whether their trust inthe
management ofthe plant would be increased or decreased on learning ofthat event. After doing
this, they rated how strongly their trust would be affected by the event on a scale ranging from 1
(very small impact ontrust) to 7 (very powerful impact ontrust).
The percentages ofCategory 7ratings, shown in Figure 4, dramatically demonstrate that
negative events are seen as far more likely to have apowerful effect on trust than are positive
events.
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Insert Figure 4 about here
There was only one event perceivedto have any substantial impact on increasing trust. This
event stated that:
An advisory board of local citizens and environmentalists is established to monitorthe
plant and is given legal authority to shuttheplant down if they believe it to be unsafe.
This strong delegation of authority to the local public was rated 6 or 7 on the impact scale by
38.4% of the respondents. Although thiswas a far stronger showing than for any other positive
event, it would havebeena rather average performance in the distribution of impacts for negative
events.
The importance ofanevent isat least inpart related to its frequency (or rarity). An accident
ina nuclear plant is more informative with regard torisk, than is a day (or even a large number of
days) without anaccident. Thus, in systems where we are concerned about low-probability/high
consequence events, problematic events will increase our perceptions ofrisk to a much greater
degree than favorable events will decrease them.
3. Adding fuel to the fire of asymmetry is yetanother idiosyncracy of human
psychology—sources ofbad (trust-destroying) news tend to beseen as more credible than
sources ofgood news. For example, inseveral studies ofwhat they called "intuitive toxicology,"
Kraus etal/20) examined people's confidence inthe ability ofanimal studies topredict human
health effects from chemicals. In general, confidence in the validity of animal studies wasnot
particularly high. However, when told that a study has found that achemical is carcinogenic in
animals, people expressed considerable confidence in the validity ofthis study for predicting
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health effects in humans. Regulators respond like the public. Positive (bad news) evidence from
animal bioassays is presumptive evidence of risk to humans; negative evidence (e.g., the
chemical was not found to be harmful) carries little weight/68)
4. Another importantpsychological tendency is that distrust, once initiated, tends to reinforce
andperpetuate distrust. This occurs in two ways. First, distrust tends to inhibit the kinds of
personal contacts and experiences that arenecessary to overcome distrust. By avoiding others
whose motives oractions we distrust, we never get to see that these people are competent, well-
meaning, and trustworthy. Second, initial trustor distrust colors our interpretation of events, thus
reinforcing our prior beliefs. Persons whotrusted the nuclear powerindustry sawthe events at
Three Mile Island as demonstratingthe soundnessof the "defense in depth" principle, noting that
the multiple safety systems shut theplant down and contained most ofits radiation. Persons who
distrusted nuclear power priorto the accident tookan entirely different message from the same
events, perceiving that those in charge did not understand what was wrong orhow to fix it and
that catastrophe was averted only by sheer luck.
Appreciation of those psychological tendencies that create and reinforce distrust leads us
toward a new perspective onrisk perception and conflict. Conflicts and controversies
surrounding risk management are not due to public irrationality or ignorance but, instead, can be
seen as expected side effects ofthese psychological tendencies, interacting with a highly
participatory Democratic system ofgovernment, and amplified by certain powerful technological
and social changes insociety. The technological change has given the electronic and print media
the capability (effectively utilized) ofinforming us ofnews from all over the world—often right
as it happens. Moreover, justas individuals give greater weight and attention to negative events,
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so do the news media. Much ofwhat the media reports isbad (trust-destroying) news/69) This is
convincingly demonstrated by Koren and Klein/70) who compared the rates ofnewspaper
reporting of two studies, oneproviding badnews andonegood news, published back to backin
the March 20, 1991 issue of the Journal ofthe American Medical Association. Both studies
examined the link between radiation exposure and cancer. The bad news study showed an
increased risk to leukemia in white men working at the Oak Risk National Laboratory. The good
news study failed to show an increased risk of cancer in people residing near nuclear facilities.
Koren and Klein found that subsequent newspaper coverage was far greater for the study
showing increased risk.
The social change is the rise ofpowerful special interest groups—well funded (by a fearful
public) and sophisticated in using their own experts and the media to communicate their concems
and their distrust to the public in order to influence risk policy debates and decisions/ )The
social problem iscompounded by the fact that we tend tomanage our risks within an adversarial
legal system that pits expert vs. expert, contradicting each other's risk assessments and further
destroying the public trust.
The young science ofrisk assessment istoo fragile, too indirect, toprevail in such a hostile
atmosphere. Scientific analysis ofrisks cannot allay our fears of low-probability catastrophes or
delayed cancers unless we trust the system. Inthe absence oftrust, science (and risk assessment)
can only feed distrust, by uncovering more bad news. Asingle study demonstrating an
association between exposure tochemicals orradiation and some adverse health effect cannot
easily be offset by numerous studies failing to find such an association. Thus, for example, the
more studies thatare conducted looking for effects of electric andmagnetic fields or other
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difficult to evaluate hazards, the more likely it is that these studies will increase public concerns,
even ifthe majority ofthese studies fail to find any association with ill health/26"27) In short,
risk-assessment studies may tend to increaseperceivedrisk.
Implications for Radiation Medicine
In 20 years of research onperception and acceptance of technological risks, there has been
remarkably little attention given to the medical uses ofradiation—quite a contrast to the hundred
ormore studies of perceptions ofnuclear power and nuclear waste. This lack of attention is
surprising, given the importance ofradiation medicine and the fact that some procedures such as
mammography screening for younger women have been the source ofmuch concern and
controversy.
In theabsence of studies specifically directed to radiation medicine, one can only speculate
about public views, based on more general findings. The use ofradiation for diagnosis and
therapy will likely stand apart from other radiation technologies because people see great benefits
from medical radiation andthey have relatively high trust in the medical profession. Where the
need is particularly evident (e.g., cancer therapy), tolerance ofrisk will be quite high, as shown
by the strong desire of AIDS patients to have access to new, potentially dangerous medicines/72)
But acceptance ofradiation exposures will undoubtedly come with anxieties, due tothe
association ofsuch exposures with the cause ofcancer as well as the cure. Moreover, the public
will likely support strict controls over radiation medicine regardless ofcosts and they will react
strongly to incidents ofimproper or incompetent administration. Research on the "social
amplification of risk" shows that even "small incidents" can produce massive "ripple effects" if
they are perceived to be caused by managerial incompetence or other blameworthy factors/7 )
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Such ripple effects could include loss of public confidence, reluctance of patients to undergo
necessary examinations and treatments, extensive litigation againstphysicians, hospitals, and
manufacturers, and demand for stricter regulatory control.
Ultimately, the best way to understand the public's viewof radiation medicine is to ask
people directly—by means of one-on-one interviews, focus groups, and structured surveys. In
this waywe can obtain a "clear image" of people's mental models pertaining to various
diagnostic and therapeutic procedures, including their knowledge and misconceptions, their
perceptions ofriskand benefit, and their attitudes toward theuse and regulation of these
procedures.
Such data are really quite easy to collect. The methods are developed and the costs are
reasonable. In the past, focused surveys have rarely failed to provide insights thatareuseful for
education and policy.
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Table 1. Ordering of Perceived Risk for 30 Activities and Technologies
League of College Active Club
Experts Women Voters students members
Nuclear power 20 1 1 8
Motor vehicles 1 2 5 3
Handguns 4 3 2 1
Smoking 2 4 3 4
Motorcycles 6 5 6 2 . .
Alcoholic beverages 3 6 7 5
General (private) aviation 12 7 15 11
Police work 17 8 8 7
Pesticides 8 9 4 15
Surgery 5 10 11 9
Fire fighting 18 11 10 6
Large construction 13 12 14 13
Hunting 23 13 18 10
Spray cans 26 14 13 23
Mountain climbing 29 15 22 12
Bicycles 15 16 24 14
Commercial aviation 16 17 16 18
Electric power (non-nuclear) 9 18 19 19
Swimming 10 19 ' 30 17
Contraceptives 11 20 9 22
Skiing 30 21 25 16
* - X-rays 7 22 17 24
High school and college football 27 23 26 21
Railroads 19 24 23 20
Food preservatives 14 25 12 28
Food coloring 21 26 20 30
Power mowers 28 27 28 25
Prescription antibiotics 24 28 21 26
Home appliances 22 29 27 27
Vaccinations 25 30 29 29
Note. The ordering is based on the geometric meanrisk ratings withineach group. Rankl
represents themostrisky activity or technology.
•
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Table 2. Hierarchy of Images Associated With an "Underground Nuclear Waste Storage Facility"
Category Frequency Images included in category
1. Dangerous 179 dangerous, danger, hazardous,
toxic, unsafe, harmful, disaster
2. Death/disease 107 death, sickness, dying,
destruction, lethal, cancer,
deformities
3. Negative 99 negative, wrong, bad, unpleasant, . _
terrible, gross, undesirable, awful,
dislike, ugly, horrible
4. Pollution 97 pollution, contamination, leakage,
spills, Love Canal
5. War 62 war, bombs, nuclear war,
holocaust
6. Radiation 59 radiation, nuclear, radioactive,
glowing
7. Scary 55 scary, frightening, concern,
worried, fear, horror
8. Somewhere Else 49 wouldn't want to live near one,
not where I live, far away as
possible
9. Unnecessary 44 unnecessary, bad idea, waste of
land
10. Problems 39 problems, trouble
11. Desert 37 desert, barren, desolate
12. Non-NV locations 35 Utah, Arizona, Denver
13. Storage location 32 caverns, underground salt mine
14. Government/industry 23 government,politics, big business
Source. Slovic et al., 1989; survey of 400 residents of Phoenix, Arizona.
Table 3. Summary of Perception
Exposure
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and Acceptance of Risks From Diverse Sources of Radiation
Perceived risk
Technical experts Public
Nuclear power/nuclear waste Moderate risk
Acceptable
Extreme risk
Unacceptable
X-rays Low/moderate risk
Acceptable
Very low risk
Acceptable
Radon Moderate risk
Needs action
Very low risk
Apathy
Nuclear weapons Moderate to extreme risk
Tolerance
Extreme risk
Tolerance
Food irradiation Low risk
Acceptable
Moderate to high risk
Acceptability questioned
Electric and magnetic fields Low risk
Acceptable
Significant concerns
beginning to develop
Acceptability questioned
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Table 4. A Framing Effect: Surgery vs. Radiation Therapy
Treatment
1 year
5 years
Percent choice of
radiation therapy
Source. McNeil et al. (1982).
Mortality rates Survival rates
Surgery Radiation Surgery Radiation
10% 0% 90% 100%
32 23 68 77
66 78 34 22
44% 18%
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Profiles for nuclear power and X-rays across nine risk characteristics. Source: Slovic,
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979.
Figure 2. Location of 31 hazards on factors 1 and 2 derived from the interrelationships among
15 risk characteristics. Each factor is made up ofa combination of characteristics, as
indicated by the lower diagram. Source: redrawn from Slovic (1987).
Figure 3. Mean perceived risk and perceived benefit for medical and nonmedical sources of
exposure to radiation and chemicals. Each item was rated on a scale of perceived risk
ranging from 1 (very low risk) to 7 (very high risk) and a scale of perceived benefit
ranging from 1 (very low benefit) to 7 (very high benefit). Note that medical sources
of exposure have more favorable benefit/risk ratings than do the nonmedical sources.
Data are from a national survey in Canada by Slovic et al. (1991).
Figure 4. Differential impact of trust-increasing and trust-decreasing events. Each event was
rated on a scale ranging from 1 (very little impact on trust) to 7 (very powerful impact
on trust). Only the percentageof respondents giving Category 7 ratings (very
powerful impact)are shown here. Source: Slovic(1993).
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Figure 2. Location of 81 hazards on Factors 1and 2derived from the interrelationships among 15 risk
characteristics. Each factor is made up ofa combination ofcharacteristics, as indicated by the lower
diagram. Source: redrawn from Slovic, 1987.
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Figure 3. Mean perceived risk and perceived benefit for^rnedical and nenmedical sources of
exposure to radiation ancLchemicals. Each item was rated on6 scaledperceived riskranging -,from livery lovffislg to 7^(s^high risk^ and a-seale-of perceived benefit ranging from y^efy
low hf^pfit) tn X/very^Tgh benefit). Notelthat medical sources of exposure have more favorable
benefit/risk ratings,than do thf.-rionrnpriirnl flourpfs. Data are from anational survey in Canada
by Slovic etal., 1991.
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Figure 3. Mean perceived risk and perceived benefit for nonmedical and medical sources
of exposure to radiation and chemicals. Each item was rated on 2 scales: perceived risk,
ranging from 1 to 7 (very low to very high risk) and perceived benefit, ranging from 1 to 7
(very low to very high benefit). Note that medical sources of exposure have more favorable
benefit/risk ratings. Data are from a national survey in Canada by Slovic et al., 1991.
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